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THE NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENT 
ACT (NSMIA) SAVINGS CLAUSE: A NEW CHALLENGE TO 
REGULATORY UNIFORMITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tension between state and federal regulation of the securities 
industry continues to exist despite the 1996 passage of the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA). 1 Congress enacted 
NSMIA to resolve decades of inefficiency and conflict in the federal-
state regulatory framework. 2 This inefficiency and conflict harmed 
mutual fund investors by "frustrat[ing] national policies designed to 
benefit fund shareholders, hinder[ing] innovative and beneficial 
products and services, impos[ing] needless compliance burdens, and 
divert[ing] state oversight resources away from critical consumer 
protection efforts."3 NSMIA attempted to address these problems by 
giving certain types of securities, 4 including nationally distributed 
mutual funds, 5 a federally imposed exemption from state securities 
registration regulations. 6 Although NSMIA preempts state 
I. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of !996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). 
2. See infra Part II.A. 
3. Matthew Fink, Mutual Fund Regulation: Forging a New Federal and State 
Partnership, 2 INVESTMENT CO. lNST. PERSPECTIVE I (Jan. 1996), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per02-0 !.pdf. 
4. A security is: 
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in 
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit 
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof) .... 
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2006). 
5. "A mutual fund is a distinct legal entity that raises money by selling shares and then 
invests in securities for the benefit of its shareholders." Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 n.l (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. 
LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). 
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a). This section exempts "covered securities" from state 
regulation of "registration or qualification of securities, or registration or qualification 
445 
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involvement in these matters, it contains a savings clause that 
preserves the states' power to investigate and prosecute fraud. 7 
Recent action by the California Attorney General attempted to 
widen this savings clause into a loophole. 8 In Capital Research & 
Management Co. v. Brown,9 the state brought an antifraud 
enforcement action against a mutual fund company's investment 
adviser 10 and distributor 11 for failure to adequately disclose revenue-
sharing agreements. 12 The suit focused on the lack of adequate 
disclosure in the mutual fund prospectuses. 13 Under NSMIA, states 
are preempted from regulating such disclosure. 14 However, in 
Capital Research, the court found that the savings clause gave the 
state the authority to enforce disclosure requirements, in effect, 
permitting the state to regulate activity that would otherwise be 
preempted under NSMIA. 15 
of securities transactions .... " !d. § 77r(a)(l). States are also preempted from 
"directly or indirectly prohibit[ing], limit[ing], or impos[ing] any conditions" on the 
offering documents (such as prospectuses) of covered securities. !d. § 77r(a)(2). See 
also infra Part II.B.1. 
7. The savings clause authorizes a state's securities commission to "retain jurisdiction 
under the laws of such State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect 
to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with 
securities or securities transactions." 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(l). 
8. See infra Part II.D. 
9. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770. 
10. !d. at 772. Capital Research and Management Company (CRMC) is the investment 
adviser for American Funds (AF). !d. AF is currently among the largest mutual fund 
companies in the United States. Americanfunds.com, About Us, 
http://www.americanfunds.com/about/index.htrn?r=t_h (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
"Each [mutual] fund contracts with an investment adviser who provides management, 
portfolio selection, and administrative services to the fund, for which the adviser is 
usually compensated based on a percentage of the fund's total assets." Capital 
Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772 n.1. 
11. See Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772. American Funds Distributor (AFD) 
distributes AF mutual fund shares to various retail broker-dealers who then sell the 
funds directly to investors. See id. 
12. See id. at 772-73. "'Revenue sharing' usually refers to payments made by fund 
advisers or their affiliated underwriters (and not by the funds themselves) to sellers of 
fund shares to compensate them for distribution and shareholder services." Mark 
Perlow, Mutual Fund Directors' Oversight of Distribution Relationships: Emerging 
Best Practices, 11 INVESTMENT LAW. 1, 10 (2004). 
13. See Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772 n.2. 
14. See infra Part II.B.1. 
15. See infra Part II.D.2. State Attorney General Jerry Brown dropped the suit in early 
February 2008, indicating that he was satisfied with AF's efforts to amend disclosure 
concerning the revenue-sharing agreements. Press Release, Office of Cal. Attorney 
Gen., Brown and American Funds End Litigation (Feb. 15, 2008), 
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1524&year=2008&month=2. As part of 
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The newly broadened interpretation of the antifraud savings clause 
defeats the purpose of NSMIA by allowing indirect regulation of 
federally preempted securities. 16 As noted by Paul Atkins, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange (SEC) Commissioner at the time, "attempts 
to augment SEC disclosure requirements through state enforcement 
actions . . . can create regulatory uncertainty and undermine the 
common federal disclosure scheme that was Congress's clear purpose 
in the [NSMIA]." 17 Courts must determine which part of NSMIA 
controls prospectus disclosure of revenue-sharing agreements. If the 
savings clause controls, then states would be permitted to compel 
additional prospectus disclosure not required under federal law. 18 
This type of state authority would undermine NSMIA's goal of 
national uniformity. 19 
This Comment will examine the developments in the securities 
industry that led to the enactment of NSMIA, 20 as well as the 
legislation's resulting effects. 21 An analysis of Capital Research22 
will cover the purposes of NSMIA as contrasted with the state 
attorney general's purpose in bringing the case. 23 Finally, the 
Comment will discuss the underlying problems associated with 
mutual fund prospectus disclosure24 and scrutinize possible solutions 
that would better address the problem while maintaining the 
uniformity of securities regulation. 25 
the settlement, Case Research & Management Co. and American Funds Distributors 
also agreed to pay the State's legal costs, totaling $2.5 million. See Tom Petruno, 
State Drops Broker Fee Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at Cl. 
16. See infra Part liLA. 
17. Paul S. Atkins, Cornm'r, SEC, Remarks Before the Investment Company Institute's 
2008 Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference ~ 13 (Mar. 17, 2008) 
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch031708psa.htm). 
18. See infra Part III.A.2. 
19. See infra Part III.A.2. 
20. See infra Part li.A.1. 
21. See infra Part li.C. 
22. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 
2007). 
23. See infra Part II.D-III.A. 
24. See infra Part 111.8. 
25. See infra Part III. C. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Securities Regulation Pre-NSMIA 
1. State of the Mutual Fund Industry 
The mutual fund industry had already ballooned from a small-scale, 
localized business to a large-scale, national juggernaut by the time of 
NSMIA's enactment in 1996.26 Not only did assets under 
management skyrocket, but the number of funds available to 
investors increased, as did the complexity of products offered. 27 
Moreover, 37% of U.S. households owned investments in mutual 
funds by this time. 28 Accordingly, the number of investment advisers 
registered with the SEC also increased from 5,400 in 1986 to over 
22,000 in 1996. 29 This expansion necessitated corresponding 
expansion in the regulatory bodies responsible for the oversight of the 
mutual fund industry. 30 
26. Mutual fund industry assets under management grew from approximately $48 billion 
in 1970, INVESTMENT CO. INST., 1971 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 16 (1971), to $2.3 
trillion in 1996. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE, 
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE U.S.: FLOWS AND 0UTSTANDINGS FOURTH 
QUARTER 1996, at 76 (Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/z I I. 
27. Securities Promotion Act of 1996: Hearing on S. 1815 Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, I 04th Cong. 3-4, 6 (1996) [hereinafter Securities 
Promotion Act Hearings] (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC), available at 
http://www .sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1996/spch I 07 .txt. 
28. INVESTMENT Co. lNST., FUNDAMENTALS I (Dec. 1996), available at 
http://members.ici.org/getPublicPDF.do?file=funl296. By comparison, 4.6 million 
households (6% of all U.S. households) owned mutual fund investments in 1980. 
INVESTMENT Co. INST., 1993 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 89 (1993). 
29. Norman Johnson, Comrn'r, SEC, Speech at Investment Company Institute~ 5 (Dec. 3, 
1996) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ speecharchive/ 
1996/spchl38.txt). 
30. See id. ~~ 5-6. 
2009] The NSMIA Savings Clause 449 
2. Conflict Between State and Federal Regulation31 
The states and the SEC have jointly regulated the securities 
industry since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 32 By the 1980s, 
the rapid growth of the U.S. financial industry began to pose 
challenges33 to the effectiveness of the existing regulatory system. 34 
Parallel enforcement of federal securities regulations and state blue 
sky laws35 increasingly resulted in duplication and conflict. 36 
31. "The debate over the respective roles of Washington and the States in securities 
regulation has been proceeding for three-quarters of a century. In 1920, Congressman 
Edward Dennison proposed a biii under which the federal government would have 
enforced state securities laws." Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the North 
American Securities Administrators Association Conference, The SEC and the States: 
Toward a More Perfect Union 'If 10 (Oct. 23, 1995) (transcript available at 
http://www .sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1995/spch058. txt). 
32. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the SEC. The Investor's Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation 'If 16, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwede.shtml#create (last visited Sept. 
26, 2008); see also Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d-d2 (1934). Concurrent 
state jurisdiction was expressly preserved by the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77v 
(1933), and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C §§ 80a-43, 80a-51 
(1940). 
33. In 1983, the SEC held its first annual conference with the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA) which represents state securities regulators. 
SEC, 49th ANNUAL REPORT, at 12 (1983), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/annual report/1983.pdf; see also SEC & NASAA, INC., 
CONFERENCE ON FEDERAL-STATE SECURITIES REGULATION, SUMMARY REPORT (Apr. 
1984). The goal was to determine how to better prevent conflict and promote 
uniformity between federal and state regulation of investment companies. SEC, 49th 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra. The NASAA committee formed at the conference issued a 
final post-conference report, recognizing the problems resulting from the lack of 
uniformity in states' regulation of investment companies and calling for the states to 
take various steps in the direction of uniformity on several different subjects such as 
registration exemptions, merit standards, and sales literature requirements. NASAA, 
INC., REPORT OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANIES COMMITTEE TO THE FALL 1984 
MEMBERSHIP MEETING (1984). Not a single one of the resolutions listed in the report 
were adopted by all of the states. /d. 
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
35. State securities laws are often referred to as "blue sky" laws, in reference to their 
purpose-to regulate "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many 
feet of 'blue sky."' Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (finding that 
state police power extended to regulation of securities); see also LOUIS Loss & 
EDWARD M. COWETI, BLUE SKY LAW 7 (1958) (examining the creation of state 
securities law). 
36. In 1984, the SEC noted the "need to increase uniformity between federal and state 
regulatory systems ... so that capital formation can be made easier while appropriate 
investor protections are retained." Annual Conference on Uniformity of State 
Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 6561, [ 1984-1985] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
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The proliferation of conflicting regulation had a particularly 
negative impact on the mutual fund industry.37 Wide-ranging state 
regulations forced fund companies to maintain complex and 
expensive compliance operations38 to ensure continuing conformity 
with differing requirements that were "full of complexities, surprises, 
unsuspected liabilities for transactions normal and usual-in short, a 
crazy-quilt of state regulations no longer significant or meaningful in 
purpose, and usually stultifying in effect, or just plain useless."39 The 
broker-dealers distributing fund shares were also subject to an 
intricate web of regulation involving the SEC, self-regulatory 
organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),40 as well as state 
blue sky laws. 41 Predictably, the burdensome costs of regulatory 
compliance resulted in higher expenses for investors. 42 
The system of parallel state and federal regulation allowed 
regulation by one state to frustrate the SEC's efforts to create a 
consistent national policy. 43 This occurred in the area of prospectus 
(CCH) ~ 83,717, at 87,193 (Dec. 6, 1984). See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., 
An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985) 
(discussing difficulties associated with the complexity and nonuniformity of state 
securities laws). 
37. Securities Promotion Act Hearings, supra note 27, at 8 ("The current scheme of 
federal-state regulation is particularly onerous for investment companies, which are 
extensively regulated by the [SEC], and whose business is fundamentally national in 
nature."). 
38. Fink, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
39. J. Sinclair Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713, 714-15 (1958). J. 
Sinclair Armstrong was SEC Chairman from 1953 to 1957. SEC Historical Summary 
of Chairmen and Commissioners, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
40. The NASD and certain operations of the NYSE consolidated on July 30, 2007 to 
become the Financial Regulatory Authority (FINRA). FINRA is now the securities 
industry's "largest non-governmental regulatory organization." Press Release, 
FINRA, NASD & NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (July 30, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoorn/ 
NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/P036329. 
41. Howard M. Friedman, The Impact of NSMIA on State Regulation of Broker-Dealers 
and Investment Advisers, 53 Bus. LAW. 511, 512 (1997-1998). This regulation from 
different sources encompassed broker-dealer business practices from registration to 
sales. !d. 
42. Atkins, supra note 17, ~ II. As is still the case, "[I]ack of [regulatory] consistency 
increases costs, which are ultimately paid by investors." !d. 
43. See, e.g., Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 Bus. LAW. 419, 431 n.62 (1996-
1997) (summarizing Ohio's frustration with SEC attempts to implement uniform 
treatment of illiquid securities within mutual fund investment portfolios); see also 
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disclosure, where regulatory requirements were all over the map. 44 
Concurrent regulation forced mutual fund companies to comply not 
only with individual state regulations, but with SEC regulations as 
well. 45 As a result, funds offering their shares for sale on a national 
basis had to conform their prospectuses to the most restrictive 
disclosure comments issued by state examiners, while at the same 
time adhering to SEC requirements. 46 In effect, the state with the 
most stringent requirements acted as the lowest common 
denominator, forcing nationally distributed mutual funds to comply 
with the state regulations and thwarting SEC efforts to benefit 
investors by creating a simplified, uniform approach to prospectus 
disclosure. 47 
State regulatory disparities were still causing problems even into 
the early 1990s. 48 The states attempted to address some of these 
problems with little success. For example, the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Investment 
Companies Committee created state guidelines for mutual fund 
prospectus disclosure; however, the guidelines differed from a similar 
policy already set in place by the SEC. 49 In addition, many states 
then added extra requirements of their own to the NASAA prospectus 
disclosure guidelines. 50 The stated purpose of the guidelines-to 
promote uniformity-was not achieved, either between federal-state 
regulations, or even from state to state. 51 SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt discussed the ramifications of the failure to achieve uniformity 
Fink, supra note 3, at 5, 8-9 ("Accordingly, if even one state insists upon restricting a 
portfolio manager's ability to invest in a manner consistent with federal law, investors 
in all states will be adversely affected."). 
44. See Fink, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
45. !d. at4. 
46. See Stevens & Tyle, supra note 43, at 431. In the late 1980s, the SEC attempted to 
simplify prospectus disclosure by amending the requirements of Form N-IA to 
standardize the disclosure of mutual fund fees and expenses. !d. However, Missouri 
required the mutual fund prospectus fee table disclosure to conform to a different 
format than the one set out by the SEC. !d. at 431 n.64. As a result, nationally 
distributed mutual funds were forced to conform prospectuses distributed in Missouri 
to the Missouri format. See id. Other states also "required fee table disclosure 
beyond that required by the SEC." !d. These types of changes "often result[ ] in 
overcrowded prospectus cover pages with inappropriate emphasis given to selected 
information." Fink, supra note 3, at 10. 
47. See Stevens & Tyle, supra note 43, at 430. 
48. !d. at 435-36. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. at 436. 
51. !d. at 435-36. 
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in a 1996 Senate hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs: 
The current system of dual federal-state regulation is not the 
system that Congress-or the [SEC]-would create today if 
we were designing a new system. While securities markets 
today are global, issuers and securities firms still must 
register many securities offerings in 52 separate 
jurisdictions; satisfy a multitude of separate books and 
records requirements; and bear the substantial costs of 
compliance with the overlapping requirements. 52 
Levitt's summary illustrates the frustrations associated with the 
lack of uniformity and the impetus behind the implementation of 
NSMIA. 
3. Legislative Response 
The introduction of legislation in the early 1990s laid the 
groundwork for making the growing problem a congressional 
priority. 53 In early 1995, legislation was proposed to exempt certain 
small investment advisers from SEC regulation. 54 This legislation 
would also preempt states from regulating larger advisers, who would 
then fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. 55 Over the next 
year, this piece of legislation evolved into the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act. 56 President Clinton signed the final 
version ofNSMIA into law on October 11, 1996.57 
52. Securities Promotion Act Hearings, supra note 27, at 8. 
53. See Stevens & Tyle, supra note 43, at 439-40. 
54. Investment Advisers Integrity Act, S. 148, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Phil Gramm 
introduced legislation that would exempt certain small investment advisers from 
federal regulation, particularly advisers with less than $5 million assets under 
management. !d. 
55. Other Senators then suggested that the legislation should shift the regulation of large 
investment advisers from the states to the federal government. Keith Bradsher, New 
Finance Decontrol Bill from G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at D5. 
56. See Assoc. Press, Securities Regulation Bill Advances, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1996, at 
D3; see also Leslie Eaton, Bill to Revise Securities Regulations Ready for Clinton, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at D4. 
57. Press Release, White House, Statement by President William J. Clinton (Oct. II, 
1996), 1996 WL 584922. President Clinton's press release described NSMIA as "the 
most significant overhaul of the securities regulatory structure in decades." !d. 
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B. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA/8 
1. Preemption Provisions 
NSMIA preempted state regulation of certain "covered securities," 
including nationally distributed mutual funds. 59 Prior to NSMIA, 
these covered securities were subject to concurrent regulation. 60 
NSMIA accomplished this change by amending several provisions of 
existing federal law: the Securities Act of 1933,61 the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,62 the Investment Company Act of 1940,63 and 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.64 These amendments created 
federal preemption in areas such as registration of securities 
offerings, 65 regulation of offering or various other documents of an 
issuer, 66 and merit or substantive regulation. 67 
Regulation of an issuer's offering documents includes the 
regulation of mutual fund prospectuses as defined under section 2(10) 
of the Securities Act. 68 States are preempted from taking actions that 
"directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions" on 
mutual fund prospectus disclosure. 69 This broad language prevents 
states from taking even indirect action to influence the language of 
mutual fund prospectuses. 70 However, as illustrated by Capital 
Research & Management Co. v. Brown, 71 this preemption is not 
necessarily absolute. 
58. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b). The definition of "covered securities" encompasses securities 
issued by investment companies that are registered under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. /d. § 77r(b)(2). "Covered securities" also refer to securities that are 
listed on a national securities exchange, as well as transactions involving securities 
that have been otherwise exempted from registration. /d. 77(r)(b)(l). 
60. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
61. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
62. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm. 
63. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64. 
64. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21. 
65. 15 U.S.C. §.77r(a)(l). 
66. /d. § 77r(a)(2). 
67. /d. § 77r(a)(3). 
68. /d. § 77r(d)(1)(A). 
69. /d. § 77r(a)(2). 
70. See id. 
71. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 
16, 2007). 
454 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
2. State Antifraud Enforcement Savings Clause 72 
Although NSMIA preempts state regulation in m<'tny areas, 73 it 
preserves state authority in limited situations, most notably the state's 
authority to bring antifraud enforcement actions. 74 This savings 
clause retains state jurisdiction as follows: 
Consistent with this section, the securities commission (or 
any agency or office performing like functions) of any State 
shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to 
investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to 
fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in 
connection with securities or securities transactions. 75 
There are no further references to this preservation of state 
regulatory power within the text of the Act. The savings clause does 
not limit state authority to fraud, but also extends it to "unlawful 
conduct by a broker or dealer."76 This ambiguous language leaves 
open an unresolved question: where did the legislature intend to draw 
the line? It is unclear whether states can implement broad legislation 
prohibiting conduct that is nevertheless permitted under federal 
securities law. 77 
C. The Securities Regulation Landscape Post-NSMIA 
1. Division of Authority 
One of NSMIA's main objectives was to alleviate the duplication 
of state and federal regulatory efforts. 78 Decreasing regulatory 
overlap between the SEC and the states was intended to allow the 
concentration of regulatory resources where most effective. 79 This 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996). 
73. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996). 
75. /d. 
76. /d. 
77. As one commentator noted, the generalized language of the savings clause "raises the 
question of when regulation of broker-dealer business practices in selling covered 
securities really amounts to one of the types of indirect regulation prohibited by 
NSMIA so that enforcement of the provisions are inconsistent with NSMIA." 
Friedman, supra note 41, at 530. 
78. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416, prefatory note (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
u.s.c. (2006)). 
79. S. REP. No. 104-293, at 3-4 (1996). 
2009] The NSMIA Savings Clause 455 
would, in tum, increase the consistency and effectiveness of the 
efforts of both state and federal regulatory bodies. 80 To this end, the 
Senate Banking Committee Report indicated that "[t]he states should 
play an important and logical role in regulating small investment 
advisers whose activities are likely to be concentrated in their horne 
state." 81 On the other hand, "[l]arger advisers, with national business, 
should be registered with the [SEC] and be subject to national 
rules."82 
The SEC and the state regulators have each interpreted this division 
of authority according to their own enforcement agenda. NASAA 
weighed in shortly after the passage of NSMIA, arguing that, "other 
regulations of business practices, even when they do not amount to 
prohibitions of fraud, should remain enforceable against large 
advisors." 83 In contrast, the SEC took the position "that a state 
should not be able to indirectly regulate the activities of SEC-
registered advisers by enforcing requirements that are defined as 
'dishonest' or 'unethical' business practices-unless the activities 
rise to the level of being 'fraudulent. "'84 NASAA created a task 
force immediately following the enactment of NSMIA to focus on 
promoting and coordinating the adoption of model state legislation 
80. See id. Shortly before the passage of NSMIA, the SEC Associate Director of 
Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations estimated that SEC staffing levels would 
only allow for examination of the average investment adviser once every 22 years. 
SEC's New Approach to Examinations of Advisers Focuses on Risk to Clients, 27 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1704, 1704-05 (Oct. 27, 1995) (statements of Eugene Gohlke, 
Assoc. Dir., SEC Office of Compliance, Inspections, & Examinations). 
81. S. REP. No. 104-293, at 4. 
82. /d. Estimates from 1992 indicated that 70% of mutual fund industry assets were 
managed by only 5% of the investment advisers. Roberts Calls for SEC and States to 
Split Investment Adviser Oversight, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1801 (Dec. 
4, 1992). Therefore, by limiting SEC responsibility to only the larger advisers, the 
SEC would be able to more readily focus its attention on that 5% of investment 
advisers, where arguably the greatest amount of risk is located. 
83. Letter to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, Regarding Rules Implementing 
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, N. Am. Sec. Admins. Ass'n Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 13,039, at 13,080-13,082 (Feb. 13, 1997); see also Rules Implementing 
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Release 
No. 1633, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 85,940, at 89,611-89,612 
(May 15, 1997). 
84. Isaac Hunt, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at the National Regulatory Services Annual 
Compliance Conference for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers: Implementing 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (Apr. 10, 1997) (transcript available 
at http://www .sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/ 1997 /spch153. txt). 
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and rules. 85 The NASAA members specifically indicated their 
intention to "err on the side of the perceived congressional intent 
where the statutory language in NSMIA was ambiguous .... " 86 It is 
unclear from the task force records how NASAA perceived the 
congressional intent behind the NSMIA savings clause. However, 
the SEC indicated its understanding of NSMIA as congressional 
recognition "that overlapping state and [SEC] regulation adds little 
investor protection, is a waste of limited regulatory resources, and 
imposes considerable burdens on the larger advisers who tend to be 
subject to the laws of multiple jurisdictions."87 This view appears to 
line up more closely with the new regulatory roles envisioned in the 
Committee record. 88 
2. State Fraud Statutes 
"[T]he most concerted attempt by state securities administrators to 
achieve uniformity" was the creation of the Uniform Securities Act 
(USA), 89 which was approved in 1956 by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 90 The USA 
defines securities fraud to include "mak[ing] an untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which it is made, not misleading."91 A substantial number of states, 
including Maryland, have adopted the USA. 92 As a result, the 
language of many state antifraud statutes continues to model that of 
the USA. 93 
85. G. Philip Rutledge, NSMIA ... One Year Later: The States' Response, 53 Bus. LAW. 
563, 568 (1997) (citing memorandum from the NASAA Bd. ofDirs. eta!. to the U.S. 
NASAA Member Representatives (Mar. 7, 1998)). 
86. !d. 
87. Johnson, supra note 29. 
88. H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996). See infra Part III.A.2 for further discussion. 
89. Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 
1997UTAHL.REV. 101,125. 
90. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. I (2002). "To the extent practicable, the 
Uniform Securities Act (1985) encourages both greater coordination between federal 
and state securities law regulation and greater cooperation among states." UNIF. SEC. 
ACT prefatory note 1985 (amended 1988). 
91. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501, 7C U.L.A. 150. Section 501 "was modeled on Rule !Ob-5 
adopted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and on Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933." /d. at cmt. I. 
92. Uniform Business & Financial Laws Locator, Cornell University, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/unifonn/vol7.htrnl#secur (last visited Sept. 25, 2008). 
93. See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 11-301 (LexisNexis 2007). The 
language of Maryland's antifraud statute tracks the language of the Uniform 
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D. Capital Research & Management Company v. Brown94 
The ambiguous scope of state authority under the NSMIA savings 
clause inevitably created a conflict with its federal preemption 
provisions. 95 This conflict surfaced in the Capital Research case, 
where the court was given the opportunity to address the reach of the 
NSMIA savings clause with respect to prospectus disclosure. 96 This 
suit was one of several actions97 brought by the California Attorney 
General, Bill Lockyer, immediately following the passage of a 
California law that gave the state attorney general unusually broad 
latitude to prosecute corporate conduct. 98 These suits focused on the 
mutual fund industry practice of revenue-sharing, 99 with Lockyer 
alleging inadequate disclosure of shelf-space agreements. 100 
Lockyer's other enforcement actions focused on broker-dealers, 101 
including Edward Jones, a broker-dealer that distributed American 
Funds (Capital Research and Management Co. (CRMC) is the parent 
company of American Funds (AF)). 102 
Securities Act Section 501 exactly. Compare id. with UNIF. SEC. ACT § 501, 7C 
U.L.A. 150. 
94. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 
2007). 
95. See id. at 775. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. at 773. 
98. See Press Release, Office of the Cal. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Lockyer 
Launches Investigation of Fraudulent Sales Practices by Mutual Funds (Jan. 2, 2004), 
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=567&year=2004. 
99. Perlow, supra note 12. 
100. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 773. "A 'shelf-space' or 'revenue-sharing' 
agreement is one where a mutual fund complex (such as American Funds) agrees to 
pay broker-dealers something extra (in addition to loads and other fees) for shelf 
space (heightened visibility, access to the 'broker-dealers' registered sales 
representatives, and placement on preferred or recommended lists)." !d. at 773 n.4. 
101. !d. at 773. A broker-dealer is defined as "a person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own account." 
Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 11-IOI(c)(I)(LexisNexis 2007). 
I 02. State Attorney General Bill Lockyer had already filed suit against Edward Jones, a 
broker-dealer that distributed American Funds, by the time of the action against 
CRMC and American Funds Distributors, Inc. (AFD). See Press Release, Office of 
the Cal. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Sues American Funds for Not 
Telling Investors Truth About Broker Payments (Mar. 23, 2005), 
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=586. The suit against Edward Jones 
alleged inadequate disclosure of shelf-space payments received from seven mutual 
fund companies, including American Funds. People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 65 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 133 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13605 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
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The Capital Research case marked the first time that a state 
brought an enforcement action against an investment adviser based 
on a theory of inadequate prospectus disclosure. 103 The relationship 
between the mutual fund and investment adviser is such that allowing 
the state regulator to bring an action against the fund's investment 
adviser almost guarantees a substantial effect on the fund as well. 104 
In effect, the state would arguably be permitted to "creat[ e] a new 
disclosure requirement for mutual funds, above and beyond what the 
SEC requires." 105 
1. Trial Court 
In 2004, California state regulators began an investigation into the 
revenue-sharing106 practices of CRMC, 107 the parent company of and 
investment adviser to AF. 108 After months of state investigation 
without any official action, CRMC filed a declaratory action against 
the state attorney general. 109 The suit alleged that Attorney General 
Bill Lockyer's investigations infringed on the SEC's jurisdiction over 
regulation of prospectus disclosure. 110 Lockyer responded by filing 
an enforcement action against CRMC and American Funds 
103. See Resp't Br., at 18-20, Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer, (Cal. Super. 
2006), rev'd sub nom. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 
(Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007) (No. Bl89249), 
2006 WL 3242946; see also Press Release, Office of Cal. Attorney Gen., supra note 
98, ~~I, 3. 
104. A mutual fund's investment adviser essentially runs the mutual fund, "provid[ing] 
management, portfolio selection, and administrative services to the fund, for which 
the adviser is usually compensated based on a percentage of the fund's total assets." 
Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772 n.l. 
105. Tom Lauricella, American Funds Sues Regulator: Company Argues California Is 
Infringing on SEC's Turf; State Files a Countersuit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2005, at 
Cl3. 
106. Perlow, supra note 12. 
107. See Lauricella, supra note 105, at CJ3. "CRMC manages AF Fund's 29 mutual funds 
(with combined assets of about $600 billion) .... " Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 772. American Funds currently has $900 billion in assets under management. 
Americanfunds.com, About Us, http://www.americanfunds.com/about/ 
index.htm?r=t_h (last visited Sept. 17, 2008). 
108. See Lauricella, supra note 105, at CJ3. The California Attorney General investigated 
disclosure of revenue-sharing arrangements at other mutual fund companies during 
that same approximate time period, including Pimco Funds and Franklin Templeton 
Investments. !d. 
I 09. See Joe Morris, American Goes on the Offensive, IGNITES, Mar. 28, 2005, 
http://www.ignites.com/articles/20050328/american_goes_offensive; see also 
Lauricella, supra note 105, at CJ3. It is "highly unusual" for a mutual fund company 
to bring a legal action against a regulator. !d. 
110. Lauricella, supra note 105, at Cl3. 
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Distributors (AFD), 111 the "wholesale" broker-dealer distributor arm 
of AF. 112 
The state alleged that CRMC's and AFD's participation in 
undisclosed shelf-space agreements violated California statutes 113 
prohibiting misleading statements or omissions of material facts in 
connection with the sale of securities. 114 The trial court characterized 
the state's argument as follows: "The gravamen of the Complaint is 
that the required Disclosure Documents (i.e., the prospectus and 
SAis) omitted several material facts that made the statements about 
other compensation to dealers and execution of portfolio transactions 
misleading." 115 The California Superior Court ultimately found that 
CRMC and AFD had "satisfied their burden of proving that 
Congress, in enacting the NSMIA, intended to preempt state law 
purporting to govern disclosure requirements m offering 
111. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 773. The suit was filed on March 24, 2005, the 
same day the CRMC and AFD suit was filed. See id; see also Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer (Cal. 
Super., 2006), rev'd sub nom. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 770 (2007) (No. BC 330770), 2006 WL 3242946. The suits were consolidated 
in April 2005 in the California Superior Court. See Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 774; see also Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer, Nos. BC 330770, BC 
330774, 2005 WL 4717680 (Cal. Super. Nov. 22, 2005), rev'd sub nom. Capital 
Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (2007). 
112. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772. "AFD distributes AF Fund's shares 
through 'selling group agreements' with more than 2,000 unaffiliated broker-dealers." 
!d. "A mutual fund's shares are sold through various channels, one of which is 
through third party broker-dealers and their sales representatives." !d. at 772 n.l. 
113. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25401, 25216(a) (West 2006). The relevant statutory language 
states: "It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or 
offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication 
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading." !d. § 25401. This is the exact 
language from the Uniform Securities Act antifraud provision. UNIF. SEC. ACT§ 501 
(amended 1958), 7B U.L.A. 510 (1985). 
114. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 3-4, Capital Research & 
Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer (Cal. Super, Mar. 24, 2005), rev'd sub nom. Capital Research 
& Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (2007) (No. BC 330770), 2005 WL 
4983333. 
115. Court's Ruling and Order Re: Defendants' Demurrer to Complaint of State of 
California at 9, Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer (Cal. Super. 2006), rev'd 
sub nom. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (2007) (Nos. 
BC 330770, BC 330774), 2005 WL 4717680. 
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documents." 116 Therefore, the state did not have the authority to 
regulate the disclosure of the shelf-space agreements. 117 
2. Court of Appeals 
On appeal, the 2nd Appellate District of the California Court of 
Appeal overturned the trial court's decision. 118 The court upheld 
state authority to "impose conditions on the use of AF Fund's 
offering documents by its investment adviser [CRMC] and broker-
dealers [AFD]," finding that the state's actions were covered by the 
express preemption provision in the NSMIA savings clause. 119 The 
court framed the issue as whether the savings clause was able to act 
as an umbrella, permitting an action "against a covered security's 
investment advisor and wholesale broker-dealer who allegedly made 
inaccurate or inadequate representations to purchasers." 120 
Congress's intent in enacting NSMIA, as well as the language, 
structure, and purpose of the act itself, were therefore the key to 
establishing the scope of the savings clause. 121 
The court determined that "[t]he primary purpose ofNSMIA was to 
preempt state 'Blue Sky' laws which required issuers to register 
many securities with state authorities prior to marketing in the 
state." 122 The court continued to place a special emphasis on the 
usage of the word "issuers," noting that, "Congress recognized the 
redundancy and inefficiencies inherent in such a system and passed 
NSMIA to preclude states from requiring issuers to register or qualify 
certain securities with state authorities." 123 Therefore, the court 
concluded that NSMIA preempted action against the issuer 
(American Funds). 124 At the same time, the court found that NSMIA 
did not intend to preempt the state from bringing this type of action 
against American Funds' investment adviser (CRMC) and distributor 
(AFD).Izs 
From the court's perspective, Congress had two objectives in 
enacting NSMIA-"the primary intent to promote national 
116. !d. at 20. 
117. See Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 771-73. 
118. See id. at 774. 
119. !d. at 775. 
120. !d. at 771-72. 
121. /d.at774-75. 
122. !d. at 775 (emphasis added) (quoting Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 
F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
123. !d. (emphasis added). 
124. !d. 
125. See id. at 778. 
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uniformity in the securities registration process by preempting state 
blue sky laws, and the secondary but equally important intent to 
encourage the continued participation of the states in preventing 
fraud in securities transactions, particularly with regard to broker-
dealers."126 First, the court determined that the state's actions against 
CRMC and AFD did not conflict with the primary intent of 
NSMIA. 127 Moreover, the state attorney general's exercise of state 
police power fulfilled the secondary purpose of NSMIA with respect 
to preventing broker-dealer fraud. 128 The court therefore concluded 
that the action was covered by the express language of the savings 
clause and thus not preempted. 129 
III. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Purpose of the Savings Clause 
Although NSMIA was "the most significant overhaul of the 
securities regulatory structure in decades," 130 it left ambiguities in 
many areas. 131 In particular, the precise reach of the antifraud 
provision remains unclear. 132 The language of the savings clause 
preserves state antifraud jurisdiction over not only fraud and deceit, 
but also over "unlawful conduct by a broker or a dealer." 133 The Act 
does not define fraud and deceit, nor does it define the standard that 
should be used to determine what constitutes unlawful conduct. 134 
1. Preemption 
The Capital Research court did not address the issue of fraud, 135 
but instead analyzed the threshold issue of whether federal law 
preempted the state attorney general's action. 136 As the court noted, 
126. !d. 
127. !d. 
128. !d. 
129. !d. at 775. 
130. Press Release, White House, supra note 57. 
131. See Robert G. Bagnall & Kimble Cannon, The National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996: Summary and Discussion, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 4 n.6 
( 1997); see also Hunt, supra note 84. 
132. Hunt, supra note 84. 
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(l) (2006). 
134. See generally National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
135. See Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 773 n.4 (Ct. App. 
2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). The court specifically 
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Preemption occurs [in] three ways: (1) where federal law 
states expressly that state law is preempted; (2) where 
federal law is so comprehensive that it leaves no room in the 
covered field for supplementary state regulation; and (3) 
where there is an actual conflict between state and federal 
law.137 
CRMC argued that the state was expressly preempted from 
bringing the suit, 138 because NSMIA expressly preempts state 
regulation of covered securities and the issuers of those securities. 139 
This includes disclosure documents, such as prospectuses, that are 
distributed by the issuers of covered securities. 140 However, the State 
Attorney General Lockyer sued CRMC, the investment adviser, and 
AFD, the distributor, as opposed to American Funds, the issuer of the 
covered securities. 141 Further, Lockyer argued that the state's 
complaint only alleged fraud on the part of CRMC and AFD, the 
investment adviser and broker-dealer, without directly challenging 
the adequacy of American Funds' disclosure documents. 142 
The court determined that NSMIA expressly preempted Lockyer's 
enforcement action, recognizing that "the Attorney General's 
enforcement action seeks relief that would impose conditions on the 
use of AF Fund's offering documents by its investment adviser and 
broker-dealers-and it is thus indisputably covered by this express 
preemption provision." 143 The court's analysis compared Capital 
Research to a previous New York case in which the court found that 
state common law fraud claims were covered by the express 
noted, "[t]he legality of the shelf-space agreements is not before us on this appeal." 
!d. 
136. See id. at 774-75. 
137. !d. (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987)). 
138. Capital Research & Mgrnt. Co. v. Lockyer, Nos. BC 330770, BC 330774, 2005 WL 
4717680 (Cal. Super. Nov. 22, 2005). The trial court rejected the express preemption 
argument, but accepted CRMC's alternative theory of implied preemption. See id. 
Lockyer argued that a "presumption against preemption" exists where the state's 
enforcement action stems from its police powers. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 775. However, CRMC contended that the "significant history of federal presence 
in the field of securities regulation" prevented any such presumption from existing. 
!d. 
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006). 
140. See id. 
141. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774. 
142. !d. 
143. !d. at 775. 
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preemption provision in the savings clause. 144 Congress clearly 
intended the savings clause to cover state common law fraud 
claims. 145 However, Capital Research did not involve a question of 
common law fraud, but rather a question of state enforcement action 
against investment adviser conduct that is federally regulated and 
historically acceptable under such regulation. 146 The court admitted 
that the state's action would impact the disclosure documents of a 
covered security. 147 However, following this admission, the court 
went on to declare that a preemption analysis was not even 
necessary. 148 Rather, the pivotal issue in the case was "whether the 
savings clause applies, not whether we are dealing with express or 
implied preemption." 149 
The court used the language of the NSMIA savings clause to avoid 
a preemption analysis. 150 Regardless of whether the state's actions 
were expressly preempted by the main preemption provision of 
NSMIA, the court concluded that the state attorney general's action 
included all of the necessary factors for enforcement under the 
savings clause. 151 Namely, the action was "(1) an enforcement 
action[,] (2) brought by a state officer performing the functions of a 
securities commission, (3) under [state] iaw[,] (4) with regard to 
fraud and deceit[,] ( 5) in connection with covered securities 
transactions." 152 Therefore, the Attorney General had the authority 
under the savings clause to bring actions against the investment 
adviser and distributor "to force them to disclose their oral 
agreements with the shelf-space brokers" even though "the Attorney 
General cannot sue AF Fund to force it to change its disclosure 
documents." 153 The court reached this conclusion by declining to 
find an ambiguity in either the preemption provision of NSMIA or in 
its savings clause. 154 In analyzing the legislative intent behind 
144. !d. at 775 n.6 (citing Zuri-Invest AG v. Natwest Fin. Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
145. See infra Part III.A.2. 
146. See Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer, Nos. BC 330770, BC 330774, 2005 
WL 4717680 (Cal. Super. Nov. 22, 2005). 
147. See Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 775. 
148. See id. at 775 n.6. 
149. !d. 
150. Jd. at 775-76. 
151. See id. at 776. 
152. !d. 
153. !d. (emphasis from original omitted). 
154. ld. 
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NSMIA, 155 the court further determined that the application of the 
savings clause to the state's action in this case was "entirely 
consistent with the purpose ofNSMIA." 156 
2. Legislative History 
Several aspects of NSMIA's legislative history contradict the 
court's finding of consistency between the state's action and the 
purpose of NSMIA. Rather, NSMIA's legislative history supports 
the assertion that Congress intended NSMIA to preclude this type of 
state action. According to the Senate Committee record, the savings 
clause was intended to preserve the states' ability "to investigate and 
bring enforcement actions under the laws of their own State with 
respect to fraud and deceit (including broker-dealer sales practices) in 
connection with any securities or any securities transactions." 157 This 
would include covered securities that Section 18 would normally 
preempt from state regulation. 158 
However, the Committee specifically contemplated and discussed 
the possibility that states would attempt to reassert regulatory 
jurisdiction over covered securities disclosure (such as 
prospectuses). 159 The Committee Report notes that "[t]he Committee 
intends to eliminate States' authority to require or otherwise impose 
conditions on the disclosure of any information for covered 
securities." 160 The Committee foresaw the possibility of a state 
regulator 
cttmg a State law against fraud or deceit or regarding 
broker-dealer sales practices as its justification for 
prohibiting the circulation of a prospectus or other offering 
document or advertisement for a covered security that does 
not include a legend or disclosure that the States believes is 
necessary or that includes information that a State regulator 
criticizes based on the format or content thereof, 161 
155. "The issue [of federal preemption] is one of Congressional intent, and our task is to 
divine that intent by examining NSMIA's language as well as its structure and 
purpose." !d. at 774 (citations omitted). 
156. !d. at 776. 
157. H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 33-34 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896. 
158. See id. at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896. 
159. See id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896--97. 
160. !d. 
161. !d., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896. 
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and indicated that the savings clause "precludes State regulators" 
from taking such action. 162 
The Committee Report goes on to offer examples of the limited 
circumstances related to prospectus disclosure within which the states 
would have the power to exercise their antifraud enforcement 
authority. 163 For instance, states would be permitted to pursue action 
alleging that a prospectus of a covered security "contained fraudulent 
financial data or failed to disclose that principals in the offering had 
previously been convicted of securities fraud." 164 The examples 
given are also considered "fraud and deceit" under existing federal 
regulations. 165 The Committee could have easily cited a violation of 
a state statute that was not also a federal violation. This would have 
clarified how the legislature intended the "fraud or deceit, or 
unlawful conduct" portion of the savings clause to be administered. 166 
In fact, given that the entire purpose of NSMIA was to promote 
uniformity of securities regulation, 167 it seems reasonable to assume 
the Committee would have specifically addressed this potential 
conflict. 
The Committee Report notes that "it is conceivable that State laws 
regarding fraud and deceit could serve as the basis of a judgment." 168 
Even so, this language does not unequivocally grant states the 
authority to regulate simply because they determine there is evidence 
of fraud or deceit under state law. The phrase "it is conceivable" 
highlights the Committee's hesitancy to provide a determinate 
foundation for the states to define fraud and deceit. 169 The 
Committee record speaks to the existence of a balancing act that 
seeks to preserve state power to police against fraud, while 
preventing possible future attempts to defeat the purpose of 
NSMIA. 170 
Most importantly, the Committee takes great care to note that 
Section 18 precludes state use of the savings clause as a loophole to 
162. !d. 
163. See id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3897. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at 33, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3895. 
166. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
167. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 
102(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3420 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
168. H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3897. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 30, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3892. 
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force covered securities to comply with state disclosure laws. 171 The 
Committee indicates that it intended "to prevent the States from 
indirectly doing what they have been prohibited from doing 
directly." 172 There is no point to NSMIA's federal preemption 
provision if states are permitted to use the savings clause as a 
backdoor. 173 The Committee's notes illustrate that the members 
foresaw this possibility of the savings clause as a catchall vehicle for 
states to reassert regulatory authority preempted by NSMIA. 174 This 
is why they took care to specifically indicate in the record that this 
interpretation would be contrary to the legislative intent behind the 
passage of the Act. 
3. Implications of the Failure to Define Fraud 
One of the major weaknesses of the savings clause is Congress's 
failure to define fraud, while extending state authority over "fraud or 
deceit, [and] unlawful conduct." 175 This phrase essentially gives each 
state the ability to define the scope of its authority. By creating a law 
that makes certain conduct unlawful, the state thereby also creates 
jurisdiction over that conduct through the "unlawful conduct" portion 
of the savings clause. 176 This creates an extremely broad umbrella 
for state enforcement actions. 
Attorney General Lockyer took advantage of this umbrella, 
bringing the Capital Research suit under a 2004 California statute. 177 
In determining the scope of the state's authority, the Capital 
Research court noted that NSMIA's express preemption provision 
171. See id. at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3896 ("Section 18 precludes State 
regulators from, among other things, citing a State law against fraud or deceit or 
regarding broker-dealer sales practices as its justification for prohibiting the 
circulation of a prospectus or other offering document or advertisement for a covered 
security that does not include a legend or disclosure that the States [sic] believes is 
necessary or that includes information that a State regulator criticizes based on the 
format or content thereof."). 
172. !d. 
173. A prominent securities law attorney later commented regarding the Capital Research 
v. Brown case that, "[t]he end result is to achieve in the industry what the NSMIA 
says you can't do directly." Tom Leswing, Calif Overstepping in American Funds 
Case, IGNITES, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/ 
20070425/calif_overstepping_american_funds_case. This appears to be exactly what 
the Committee intended to avoid. See also H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 34, reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896. 
174. H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,3896-97. 
175. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2006) .. 
176. See id. 
177. CAL. CORP. CODE§§ 25401, 25216(a) (West 2006). 
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prohibits state action that even indirectly limits the use of a mutual 
fund prospectus. 178 However, the state's enforcement action fell 
under the express exception provided by the savings clause. 179 The 
court, in part, based this determination on analysis of the following 
savings clause language: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
section ... " 180 The court interpreted this statement to mean that the 
savings clause should be looked at "to determine the true scope of the 
prohibition." 181 However, the court did not similarly examine the 
introductory phrase of the savings clause. 182 
The language of the savings clause does not explicitly define "fraud 
or deceit," 183 but the clause's introductory phrase sheds some light on 
how the legislature intended "fraud" to apply. 184 The clause begins, 
"[ c ]onsistent with this section, the securities commission . . . shall 
retainjurisdiction." 185 The wording "[c]onsistent with this section"186 
indicates that, in order for conduct to fall within the category of 
"fraud," which states are permitted to regulate, the regulated activity 
must be "grounded in conduct other than that which states are 
expressly preempted from regulating more generally." 187 For the 
most part, states are expressly preempted from regulating a broker-
dealer's offer or sale of securities "based upon a merits standard 
relating to terms and issuer characteristics." 188 However, the state 
antifraud jurisdiction would still cover broker-dealers who "are acting 
unlawfully if they do not observe a suitability standard, which 
focuses on the fitness of securities for a particular purchaser." 189 
There is a key differentiation between regulation of broker-dealer 
conduct at the point of sale as opposed to disclosure language in a 
178. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775 (Ct. App. 2007), 
cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). 
179. People v. Edward P. Jones & Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 139 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. 
denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13605 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
180. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006). 
181. Edward Jones, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139. 
182. See id. at 138--40. 
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(I). 
184. See id. 
185. !d. 
186. !d. 
187. RONALD J. COFFEY, REFORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION: EFFICIENT FEDERALISM? 28 (1997), 
http://www.law.case.edu/faculty/documents/coffey/top.html#DIPLIC (discussing the 
legislative intent behind interpretation of the NSMIA antifraud savings clause). 
188. !d.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a). 
189. COFFEY, supra note 187, at 28. 
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mutual fund prospectus; the broker-dealer has no control over the 
prospectus language. 190 
If the language of the savings clause remains as is, states will be 
able to effectively regulate disclosure in mutual fund prospectuses as 
occurred in Capital Research. 191 Legal action against an investment 
adviser or broker-dealer for distributing a fund prospectus that the 
state determines does not contain adequate disclosure language has 
the indirect, but substantial, effect of regulating the contents of that 
prospectus. The majority of mutual funds are distributed through 
broker-dealers. 192 The California decision essentially determined that 
shares of AF could not be distributed in California until the 
disclosure language was changed to comply with California state 
law. 193 In effect, Capital Research allows the state regulator to 
indirectly force mutual funds listed as "covered securities" under 
NSMIA to comply with state disclosure requirements. 194 
Capital Research turned on whether the broker-dealer and 
investment adviser could be held liable for the disclosure in a mutual 
fund prospectus or lack thereof. 195 The extent of either party's 
disclosure obligation can be interpreted as either independent of or 
dependent on the mutual fund prospectus disclosure. If independent, 
then this obligation would exist regardless of how comprehensively 
the prospectus disclosed the shelf-space agreements. However, if 
their disclosure obligations are dependent, then adequate disclosure 
in the prospectus would seem to relieve the investment adviser and 
broker-dealer of any respective duty to disclose. 
Since the Capital Research court spent a substantial part of the 
opinion discussing the lack of mutual fund prospectus disclosure, 196 it 
190. See Robert A. Robertson, In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus, 54 Bus. 
LAW. 461,471-75 (1999). 
191. 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776--78 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 
(May 16, 2007). 
192. See generally Victoria Leonard-Chambers & Michael Bogdan, Investment Co. lnst., 
Why Do Mutual Fund Investors Use Professional Financial Advisers?, 16 RESEARCH 
FUNDAMENTALS I, 2 (Apr. 2007), available at http://members.ici.org/ 
getPublicPDF.do?file=funl60 I. 
193. See Brief of Respondent at n.2, Edward Jones & Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., No. C053407 
(Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2007), 2007 WL 623751; see also Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 777-78. 
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 77 r(a)-(b) (2006). Attorneys interviewed by the Wall Street Journal 
regarding Lockyer's pursuit of mutual fund revenue-sharing disclosure indicated that, 
"Mr. Lockyer was essentially creating a new disclosure requirement for mutual funds, 
above and beyond what the SEC requires." Lauricella, supra note 105, ~ 16. 
195. See generally Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770. 
196. See generally id. 
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is clear that the court perceives the two sets of obligations as 
interrelated. If the investment adviser's and broker-dealer's 
obligations were not tied to the mutual fund's obligation, then the 
disclosure in the prospectus would be a non-issue. By taking 
advantage of this interdependent relationship, the court's expansion 
of the state's authority under the antifraud savings clause effectively 
enables the state to regulate the mutual fund prospectus disclosure 
through regulation of the investment adviser or broker-dealer. 
The Capital Research case is particularly disturbing because it is 
the first time since the enactment of NSMIA that a state has 
successfully brought an enforcement action against a "covered" 
investment adviser. 197 The court clearly stated that its holding did not 
apply to the fund company directly, indicating that "[i]t is the 
wholesale distributor's conduct that is at issue in this case (and the 
enabling conduct of the adviser), not the sufficiency of the 
disclosures made by AF." 198 However, the court did recognize that 
"this action, if successful, might indirectly encourage AF Fund to 
alter its disclosure documents." 199 The court uses the word 
"might,"200 but the words "almost certainly" would be more accurate. 
Although the state was unable to bring an action directly against AF, 
the court acknowledged that they would effectively be forced to alter 
their prospectus language. 201 The court's decision accomplished an 
admirable end: increasing the transparency of prospectus disclosure. 
However, the means that the court used to reach its decision not only 
defeats the primary purpose of NSMIA, but also exacerbates the 
underlying problem of how best to encourage meaningful disclosure 
of conflicts of interest. 
B. Mutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure 
1. Disclosure of Revenue-Sharing Conflicts of Interest 
The controversy surrounding the state's authority to compel 
investment adviser disclosure of revenue-sharing agreements stems 
from the basic conflicts of interest associated with such agreements. 
197. See Josh Friedman, Court Backs American Funds in Suit, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,2005, 
at C4 ("[A] win for Lockyer could mean new regulatory standards for an industry 
historically governed by federal rules."). 
198. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776. 
199. !d. 
200. !d. 
201. See id. 
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In Capital Research, 202 the California Attorney General described the 
relevant revenue-sharing agreements as "a potential conflict of 
interest because they raised the risk that brokers would push the 
funds that paid their firms the most, rather than those most 
appropriate for their clients."203 In general, state securities 
regulations are targeted at preventing investor fraud. 204 As a result, 
these conflicts of interest invariably attract the attention of state 
securities regulators because of the potential for abuse in the 
investment sales and distribution process. 205 
The average mutual fund investor heavily relies on a financial 
professional's advice for help choosing his or her mutual fund 
investments. 206 According to a 2006 Investment Company Institute 
(ICI) survey, many investors have a difficult time understanding the 
information in typically lengthy and complicated mutual fund 
prospectuses. 207 In particular, 59% of recent fund investors 
"describe[ d] mutual fund prospectuses as very or somewhat difficult 
to understand."208 Roughly 65% indicated that "prospectuses contain 
too much information."209 Given that only 8% of investors in the 
survey read the entire prospectus for each of the mutual funds they 
purchased, 210 it is not surprising that many investors rely on advice 
from financial professionals when choosing a new investment. In 
fact, 73% of recent fund investors consulted a professional financial 
adviser before their most recent mutual fund purchase, with 60% 
202. !d. 
203. Friedman, supra note 197, ~ 5. 
204. The regulatory group that represents state secunties administrators, NASAA, 
describes its primary mission as "investor protection." About NASAA, 
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) ("Organized in 
1919, the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is the 
oldest international organization devoted to investor protection."). 
205. Cf Perlow, supra note 12. 
206. See generally Leonard-Chambers & Bogdan, supra note 192 (discussing the rationale 
behind mutual fund investors' use of professional advisers). 
207. SANDRA WEST & VICTORIA LEONARD-CHAMBERS, INVESTMENT Co. INST., 
UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 23 (2006), 
available at http://members.ici.org/getPublicPDF.do?file=investor_prefs0806. 
208. !d. 
209. !d.; see also Diya Gullapalli, In the Top Cop's Office in Washington, The Search for 
More Fund Skeletons, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2007, at Rl, R5 (interview with SEC 
Chairman Andrew Donohoe). Donohoe described printing out "some of the 
documents that we would expect an investor might be interested in when making an 
investment decision, including the prospectus, statement of additional information, 
annual report and semi-annual reports. For one fund it was over 500 pages .... " !d. 
210. WEST & LEONARD-CHAMBERS, supra note 207, at 25. 
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indicating that their adviser was the most important source of 
information in the decision to purchase. 211 
This relationship between investor and financial professional can 
create a conflict of interest. The investor trusts the financial 
professional to act in the investor's best interest. However, the 
existence of a shelf-space agreement can produce a situation where 
the investor's personal interest may conflict with that of the financial 
professional. 212 Some revenue-sharing agreements give the financial 
professional a higher commission for investor purchases of certain 
preferred mutual funds. 213 The average investor would not recognize 
that this conflict of interest exists. This arrangement may be 
disclosed in the fund's statement of additional information (SAl), as 
in Capital Research; 214 however, most investors relying on a 
financial professional do not read the lengthy, complex disclosure 
document. 215 Even if the investor did read the SAl disclosure, he or 
she would still be unlikely to understand the mechanics of a shelf-
space agreement and the conflicts of interest that may arise. From 
this perspective, state regulators have a valid justification for viewing 
a financial adviser's failure to inform a potential investor of a shelf-
space agreement as a form of fraud. 
A SEC examination sweep in 2003 found that shelf-space 
agreements were a widely used form of revenue-sharing 
agreements. 216 Fourteen out of fifteen broker-dealers examined were 
receiving monetary compensation for participation in some form of 
211. !d. at 17. 
212. See Perlow, supra note 12. 
213. See, e.g., People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 132-33 (Ct. App. 
2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13605 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
214. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 (Ct. App. 2007), 
cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). 
215. WEST & LEONARD-CHAMBERS, supra note 207, at 25. In addition, the SAl is only 
required to be provided to an investor on request. SEC, Information Available to 
Investment Company Shareholders, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinfo.htm (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
216. Oversight Hearing on Regulatory Reforms to Protect Our Nation's Mutual Fund 
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
108th Cong. 28029 (2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman); see 
also Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other 
Practices that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Management, the Budget & International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 6-7 (2004) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Oversight Hearing] 
(statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America). 
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shelf-space agreement. 217 The compensation from these agreements 
ranged from 5 to 40 basis points at the time that the investor 
purchased the mutual fund shares and ongoing compensation of 0 to 
25 basis points based on the amount of the investor's mutual fund 
assets that continued to be invested through the broker-dealer. 218 
Thirteen out of the fifteen brokers "appear to have favored the sale of 
the revenue sharing funds by providing increased access and 
visibility in the broker-dealer's sales networks (e.g., listings on firms' 
websites, access to sales staff, promotional material sent to 
customers, inclusion on firms' recommended lists)."219 In addition to 
providing these supplementary services, approximately half of the 
broker-dealers gave extra compensation to registered representatives 
for sales of these preferred mutual funds-more compensation than 
was normally received for sales of other nonpreferred mutual 
funds. 220 This second form of remuneration is much more 
troublesome. It gives the individual registered representative a direct 
financial incentive to sell a particular mutual fund, for reasons 
beyond suitability for the investor who is relying on the 
representative for sound, objective financial advice. Moreover, the 
mutual funds involved in the shelf-space arrangements generally 
provided only broad disclosure of the existence of possible broker-
dealer compensation related to sales and distribution. 221 
In Capital Research, AFD asserted that this additional shelf-space 
compensation was disclosed in the prospectus. 222 The prospectus 
language stated that AFD "may pay[] or sponsor informational 
meetings for [ ] dealers as described in the [SAI]."223 In addition, the 
SAl disclosed that AFD 
at its expense (from a designated percentage of its income), 
currently provides additional compensation to dealers. 
Currently these payments are limited to the top 100 dealers 
who have sold shares of [ AF Fund] . . . . These payments 
are based principally on a pro rata share of a qualifying 
217. Mutual Fund Oversight Hearing, supra note 216 (statement of Travis Plunkett, 
Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America). 
218. /d.at6. 
219. !d. at 7. 
220. !d. 
221. See, e.g., People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 
2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13605 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
222. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 (Ct. App. 2007), 
cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). 
223. !d. 
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dealer's sales. [AFD] will, on an annual basis, determine 
the advisability of continuing these payments. 224 
473 
AFD explained the shelf-space arrangement as merely additional 
compensation "to defray the costs of training the dealers' registered 
representatives . . . who help dealers match appropriate investments 
to their clients' long term investment needs."225 In contrast, the 
California Attorney General characterized the arrangements as 
"kickbacks"226 that "adversely affect[ ed] the relationship between 
broker-dealers and mutual funds on the one hand, and their customers 
on the other."227 
2. SEC Enforcement Actions 
Proponents of increased state regulatory power often portray state 
encroachment on SEC regulatory territory as a justified response to 
the SEC's ineffective monitoring ofthe financial services industry. 228 
However, the SEC has been very active in addressing the issue of 
revenue-sharing disclosure. 229 SEC enforcement actions have 
generally focused on violations of Rule 1 Ob-1 0 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.230 Under this rule, any third party 
compensation received by a broker-dealer for a client's mutual fund 
purchase must be disclosed in writing. 231 The SEC requirements 
differ from the Capital Research approach in that the broker-dealer's 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. "[W]hen you look beneath the cloak of legitimacy, the payments are little more than 
kickbacks to buy preferential treatment." Press Release, Office of the Cal. Attorney 
Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Sues American Funds For Not Telling Investors 
Truth About Broker Payments, at 1 (Mar. 3, 2005), http://ag.ca.gov/n 
ewsalerts/release.php?id=586. 
227. Capital Research, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 773. 
228. Cf Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts 
Between State & Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REv. 317, 329 
(2004). 
229. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) described nine 
different successful enforcement actions filed by the SEC during a three-year period 
from 2003 to 2006 in their amicus curiae brief in support of the California Attorney 
General. Brief for NASAA, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9-10 & 
n.10, Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Lockyer, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 
2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007) (No. B 189249), 2006 WL 
3446894. 
230. See, e.g., Perlow, supra note 12. 
231. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a) (2008). This compensation includes revenue-sharing 
payments. Perlow, supra note 12. 
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obligation to disclose is satisfied by delivery of a prospectus 
containing adequate disclosure. 232 
a. American Funds & Edward Jones 
The SEC investigations of American Funds and Edward Jones 
occurred during the same timeframe as the suits brought by the 
California Attorney General.233 The SEC's three-year scrutiny of 
American Funds centered on allegations of directed brokerage, 234 
rather than improperly disclosed shelf-space agreements. The SEC 
maintained that American Funds "had for years paid brokerages 
inflated trading commissions as a reward for pushing their brokers to 
sell the company's funds." 235 The SEC finally abandoned the 
investigation in October 2007, without filing a case against the 
mutual fund complex. 236 
In contrast, the SEC's investigation of Edward Jones for improper 
disclosure of revenue-sharing agreements resulted in a $75 million 
settlement. 237 The SEC ultimately found that Edward Jones had 
failed to disclose the payments that it was receiving from seven 
preferred mutual fund families, including American Funds, in 
exchange for promoting those funds to Edward Jones's clients. 238 
California Attorney General Locker referred to the settlement as 
"inadequate"239 in spite of the $75 million payment and Edward 
Jones's creation of a disclosure document detailing compensation 
from the seven preferred mutual fund families. 240 
232. Delivery and Disclosure Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 13,508, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 81,143, at 87,931 n.41 (May 5, 
1977). 
233. Tom Petruno, SEC Eyes Fund Firm's Trade Costs, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at Cl. 
234. See Press Release, SEC, Edward Jones to Pay $75 Million to Settle Revenue Sharing 
Charges (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-177.htm. Directed 
brokerage refers to arrangements where "a fund directs the execution of a portion of 
the fund's trades through a particular broker-dealer. In exchange for those brokerage 
commissions, the broker-dealer agrees to pay certain fund expenses, provide services 
to the fund, or provide a cash rebate to the fund through a commission recapture 
program." Mutual Fund Oversight Hearing, supra note 216, at 12 (statement of Marc 
E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association). 
235. Petruno, supra note 233. 
236. !d. 
237. See Press Release, SEC, supra note 234. The settlement was a joint settlement agreed 
to by the SEC, NASD, and the NYSE. !d. 
238. !d. 
239. Laura Johannes, John Hechinger & Deborah Solomon, Edward Jones Agrees to Settle 
Host of Charges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at C1. 
240. Chris Frankie, Edward Jones Reveals Revenue-Sharing Details, IGNITES, Jan. 14, 
2005, ~~ 1-2, http://www.ignites.com/articles/print/20050114/ 
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b. Other SEC enforcement actions 
1. Hartford Funds 
The SEC brought a successful enforcement action against Hartford 
Funds in late 2006 for misleading disclosure of shelf-space 
agreements in fund prospectuses. 241 This differed from the Edward 
Jones investigation in that the SEC did not allege improper disclosure 
on the part of the broker-dealer. 242 Rather, the issue was that the 
prospectus language contained statements that were false and 
misleading. 243 The prospectus represented that shelf-space 
compensation to broker-dealers was paid out of the revenue of the 
mutual fund company and the distributor, as opposed to coming from 
the fund's assets. 244 The SEC found that the disclosure statements 
were misleading because Hartford Investment and Hartford 
Distribution sometimes used brokerage commissions from 
transactions within the fund portfolio of investments as compensation 
to shelf-space partners. 245 Revenue from portfolio transactions 
belongs to the fund, and investors own the mutual fund shares; 
therefore, the SEC determined that the additional compensation was, 
in fact, paid by Hartford Fund investors. 246 
n. Franklin Templeton 
The SEC also successfully pursued the investment adviser and 
distributor for Franklin Templeton mutual funds with regard to their 
practice of using fund assets to compensate broker-dealers for shelf 
space. 247 From 2001 to 2003, Franklin Templeton maintained shelf-
edwardjones_reveals_revenue_sharing_details; see also Edward Jones, Preferred 
Fund Families, Fee Disclosures and Revenue Sharing, http://www.edwardjones.com/ 
en_US/products/investments/mutual_funds/preferred/index.html (last visited Oct. 31, 
2008). 
241. In re Hartford lnv. Fin. Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, [2006-2007 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1]87,712, '1]'1]83,766-83,767 (Nov. 8, 2006). 
242. Compare id. with Press Release, SEC, supra note 234. 
243. In re Hartford lnv. Fin. Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 54,720, [2006-2007 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1]87,712, '1]'1]83,766-83,767 (Nov. 8, 2006). 
244. !d. 'I] 83,768. The prospectus language disclosed that additional compensation was 
paid to broker-dealers but then specifically stated that "[t]his additional compensation 
is not paid by you." /d. '1]'1]83,767-83,768. 
245. !d. '1]'1]83,767-83,768. 
246. See id. '1]83,768. 
247. Press Release, SEC, Franklin Advisers and Franklin Templeton Distributors to Pay 
$20 Million to Settle Charges Related to Use of Brokerage Commissions to Pay for 
Shelf Space (Dec. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Franklin Templeton Press Release], 
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space agreements with 39 broker-dealers. 248 Although the shelf-
space agreements themselves were permitted, Franklin Templeton 
used fund assets, in the form of brokerage commissions, to 
compensate those broker-dealers. 249 The SEC action centered on 
Franklin Templeton's failure to disclose this use of fund assets. 250 
The Capital Research case differs from the Franklin Templeton 
situation in that American Funds used its own assets, rather than the 
assets of the funds, as compensation for shelf-space agreements with 
Edward Jones and other broker-dealers. 251 
C. Possible Disclosure Solutions 
The continuing overlap between state and federal regulation of 
revenue-sharing agreements is symptomatic of an underlying 
problem in the financial industry. Regulation of disclosure will 
continue to be an issue until the industry as a whole improves its 
methods of communicating information about conflicts of interest in 
the sales and distribution process. The use of visible, plain English 
disclosure would resolve the controversy surrounding disclosure of 
revenue-sharing agreements and reduce the need for regulatory 
enforcement. 
Several different forms of disclosure have been proposed in the 
past five years, including disclosure on mutual fund purchase 
confirmations, 252 enhanced disclosure in a more user-friendly Form 
ADV, 253 and disclosure in a summary prospectus. 254 As SEC 
Director Andrew Donohoe commented in a 2007 Wall Street Journal 
interview, "[w]e can't mandate that people read disclosures. What 
we can do is to require that the disclosures are more meaningful to 
them."255 The three forms of disclosure listed above take different 
approaches, but they all share the same goal of making disclosure 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-168.htm. Franklin Templeton agreed to pay a 
$20 million penalty as part of a settlement with the SEC in December 2004. !d. 
California Attorney General Lockyer had also brought an action against Franklin 
Templeton, resulting in an $18 million settlement the month before Lockyer filed the 
suit against Edward Jones. Gillian Flaccus, Attorney General Files Fourth Suit 
Against Calif Brokers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (L.A.), Mar. 25, 2005, 'IJ II. 
248. Franklin Templeton Press Release, supra note 247. 
249. See id. 
250. /d. 
251. See Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 (Ct. App. 
2007), cert. denied, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5149 (May 16, 2007). 
252. See infra Part III. C. I. 
253. See infra Part III.C.2. 
254. See infra Part III.C.3. 
255. Gullapalli, supra note 209, at R1, 'I) 34. 
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more meaningful to investors. Each form, however, has different 
advantages and drawbacks associated with its implementation. 
1. Disclosure on Mutual Fund Purchase Confirmations 
In 2005, the SEC proposed a rule that would have mandated the 
inclusion of substantial disclosure on each mutual fund trade 
confirmation. 256 Brokers are normally required to disclose the source 
and amount of compensation they receive from a sale of a security to 
an investor-this is not the case with the sale of mutual fund 
shares. 257 The proposed disclosure would have required 
confirmations to contain detailed language discussing, for example, 
the amount of any front-end sales loads, estimates of contingent 
deferred sales loads, 12b-ls, commissions received by the broker, as 
well as disclosure of revenue-sharing agreements between the broker-
dealer and the mutual fund company. 258 Disclosure of revenue-
sharing agreements, such as shelf-space agreements, would be 
expressed "on the basis of the firm's sales on behalf of the fund 
complex, as a percentage of the total net asset value represented by 
the broker-dealer's total sales of mutual funds within the complex 
over the four most recent calendar quarters, updated each calendar 
quarter."259 The broker-dealer would also have to disclose "the total 
dollar amount of revenue sharing or portfolio brokerage commissions 
that the firm may expect to receive in connection with the transaction, 
calculated by multiplying that percentage by the net amount of the 
transaction."260 
Disclosure located on a confirmation is arguably more easily and 
more frequently seen by the investor. This is in contrast to disclosure 
256. See Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds, College Savings Plans, and Certain Other 
Securities, and Amendments to the Registration Form for Mutual Funds, 70 Fed. Reg. 
10,521 (proposed Mar. 4, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240 & 274) 
[hereinafter Proposed Confirmation Disclosure Rule]. 
257. See Mutual Fund Oversight Hearing, supra note 216 (statement of Travis Plunkett, 
Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America). 
258. See Letter from George R. Kramer, Sec. Indus. Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC 
Sec'y, Re: Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, File No. S7-06-04, at 4-5 
(Apr. 12, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s70604/sia041204.pdf. The SIA's comment letter suggested layered disclosure 
similar to that of the newly proposed summary prospectus; see infra Part III.C.3. 
259. Kramer, supra note 258, at 6. 
260. !d. Broker-dealers would be required to update this information each quarter within a 
30-day window. /d. 
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located in the prospectus, which most investors do not read in full, 261 
or the SAl, which does not need to be given to an investor unless 
specifically requested. 262 However, this approach is problematic in 
that the cost to implement personalized disclosure, both initially and 
on an ongoing basis, may be prohibitive. 263 There are also 
competitive issues with listing the specific amount of revenue-
sharing. 264 Equally important, this type of disclosure is not 
conducive to allowing investors to easily make comparisons between 
various funds or investment scenarios. 265 Disclosure of different fees 
and expenses, when placed on a mutual fund confirmation, is 
transaction-specific, meaning that it only applies to the particular 
transaction in question. 266 
2. Enhanced Form ADV II Disclosure 
Another proposed rule involves the implementation of a plain 
English, narrative Form ADV. 267 Mutual fund investors would 
receive the "narrative brochures" at the time of their first purchase of 
that mutual fund, and then annually on an ongoing basis. 268 The new 
disclosure would include any violation of securities laws, as well as 
the advisers' conflicts of interest with clients. 269 One advantage to 
this form of disclosure is the anticipated low cost of 
implementation. 270 Other than costs associated with the initial 
drafting, the new Form ADV disclosure is not expected to require 
significant expenditures. 271 However, this form of disclosure would 
primarily focus on fees and conflicts of interest associated with the 
investment adviser. 272 It is unlikely that there would be meaningful 
261. See WEST & LEONARD-CHAMBERS, supra note 207, at 25. 
262. See SEC, Information Available to Investment Company Shareholders, supra note 
215. 
263. See Proposed Confirmation Disclosure Rule, supra note 256, at 10,522. 
264. See id. at 10,537 n.68. 
265. See id. at 10,526. 
266. See Kramer, supra note 258, at 5, 17. 
267. See Amendments to Form ADV, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,958 (proposed Mar. 14, 2008) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279). The SEC requires SEC-registered investment 
advisers "to provide clients and prospective clients with a disclosure statement [the 
Form ADV] providing information about the adviser, its business practices, the fees it 
charges, and its conflicts of interest." !d. 
268. See id. at 13,959. 
269. See id. at 13,959, 13,964. 
270. See id. at 13,982. 
271. !d. 
272. See id. at 13,959. 
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disclosure indicating to an investor whether his or her financial 
representative has a financial incentive to sell certain mutual funds. 273 
3. The Summary Prospectus 
The SEC recently implemented an overhaul of the current 
prospectus delivery requirements with the introduction of the 
summary prospectus. 274 The new rule "require[ s] key information to 
appear in plain English in a standardized order at the front of the 
mutual fund statutory prospectus."275 The summary section contains 
information such as the fund's investment objectives and strategies, 
risks, costs, and performance. 276 This summary information can also 
be made available in a stand-alone summary prospectus that would 
likely be three to four pages in length. 277 Previously, an investor had 
to receive a full-length statutory prospectus prior to making a mutual 
fund purchase. 278 Under the new rule, receipt of the summary 
prospectus alone satisfies the delivery requirement, as long as the 
statutory prospectus is available both on the Internet and by investor 
request. 279 
Both investors and the mutual fund industry appear to agree that 
the implementation of the summary prospectus will result in more 
meaningful disclosure and enable investors to make more informed 
investment decisions. 280 Although there is a general consensus 
273. See id. at 13,963. 
274. See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-
End Management Investment Companies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239 & 274) [hereinafter Summary Prospectus 
Rule]. The Director of the SEC's Division oflnvestment Management explained that, 
"[m]any investors often find current fund prospectuses to be lengthy, legalistic and 
confusing. This mutual fund disclosure framework will provide information that is 
easier to use and more readily accessible, while retaining the comprehensive quality 
of the mutual fund information available today." Press Release, SEC, SEC Improves 
Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors (Nov. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-275.htm. 
275. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274. 
276. !d. at 4548. 
277. See id. 
278. See id. 
279. ld. The summary prospectus would therefore involve layered disclosure - simplified 
disclosure in a prominent position, combined with more detailed disclosure available 
online or in a print statutory prospectus. See id. 
280. See generally Comments on Proposed Rule: Enhanced Disclosure and New 
Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment 
Companies, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07 /s72807 .shtml (last visited Apr. 
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surrounding the advantages of the summary prospectus, there are also 
a few concerns. 281 Mutual fund companies are apprehensive about 
potential liability associated with such a dramatically shortened 
prospectus, as well as the reliance on technology for the Internet-
based disclosure. 282 In addition, the rule does not allow for integrated 
prospectuses. 283 Many mutual fund companies use integrated 
prospectuses to simplify the comparison process for investors. 284 The 
new rule requires fund companies to create separate summary 
prospectuses for all of their mutual funds, even related funds, making 
it more time-consuming for investors to compare those funds. 285 
Lastly, the summary prospectus proposal requires boilerplate 
intermediary compensation disclosure indicating that, "the Fund and 
its related companies may pay the intermediary for the sale of Fund 
shares and related services. These payments may create a conflict of 
interest by influencing the broker-dealer or other intermediary and 
your salesperson to recommend the Fund over another 
investment." 286 The general disclosure does not "quantif[y] the 
financial incentives that conventional distribution arrangements 
create for brokers to recommend the highest-paying fund, regardless 
of the best fit for the client."287 The SEC noted that a previously 
13, 2009) [hereinafter Comments on Proposed Summary Prospectus Rule]; see also 
Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274, at 4548. 
281. See Gary 0. Cohen, Summary Versus Profile Prospectus Liability, INVESTMENT LAW., 
Feb. 2008, at 3. 
282. See id. at 3-4. 
283. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274, at 4549. "An integrated prospectus 
organizes the information by topic or subject-matter for similar funds, eliminating 
redundancies and using charts to compare information across the funds." Darrell N. 
Braman & Brian R. Poole, In Search of the Holy Grail: Has the SEC Found It with 
Prospectus Disclosure Reform?, INVESTMENT LAW., Feb. 2008, at 10. The SEC's 
discussion of the rule expresses concern regarding the potential length and complexity 
of an integrated summary prospectus. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274, at 
4549. It would defeat the purpose of the rule to allow a fund company to integrate all 
of its funds into one summary prospectus. See id. 
284. See Letter from Darrell N. Braman, Assoc. Legal Counsel, T. Rowe Price et al., to 
Nancy M. Morris, SEC Sec'y 3-5 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-118.pdf. The integrated approach 
offers significant benefits to investors looking to compare similar products, such as 
target-date retirement funds. !d. at 3. 
285. See Braman & Poole, supra note 283, at 10. 
286. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274, at 4557. The required disclosure will also 
direct a fund investor to ask his or her salesperson or to visit the applicable financial 
intermediary website for more information. !d. 
287. Letter from Mercer Bullard, Fund Democracy, Barbara Roper, Consumer Fed'n of 
Am. & Ken McEldowney, Consumer Action, to Nancy M. Morris, SEC Sec'y, at 13 
(Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807.shtml. 
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proposed rule specifically addressed point-of-sale disclosures of 
conflicts of interest, but that initiative was proposed in early 2005, 
and it seems unlikely that it will soon become a priority. 288 
Overall, the summary prospectus seems to be an effective, popular 
solution to improving prospectus disclosure. 289 Although it will not 
contain personalized disclosure of fees and conflicts of interest, it 
will allow investors to begin using the prospectus as a primary source 
of information, rather than solely as a legally required document. 
D .. Balkanization290 
The California Attorney General's use of the NSMIA savings 
clause may tum out to be an anomaly rather than the beginning of a 
trend. The previous New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, was 
similarly aggressive in expanding state jurisdiction over securities 
regulation. 291 His focus on the financial sector in 2002 through 2005 
created apprehension about a further shift towards state regulation of 
the financial services industry. 292 However, the political makeup of 
the state attorney general offices increases the likelihood that attorney 
generals will "focus scarce resources on a more traditional consumer 
protection and health and safety agenda."293 Spitzer and Lockyer 
were the state attorney generals most focused on the financial 
288. Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 274, at 4557 n.l55. 
289. See generally Comments on Proposed Summary Prospectus Rule, supra note 280. 
290. The term "balkanization" refers to the theory that "the creation and enforcement of 
securities market reforms devised by individual states will destroy the integrity of a 
single, efficient national market system." Johnathan Mathiesen, Dr. Spitz/ave Or: 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love "Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REv. 311,313 (2006). 
291. Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Debate Continues on Whether Wall Street 
Changes Have Aided Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2008, at Al8. Eliot Spitzer 
used New York's Martin Act, "a uniquely harsh law allowing prosecutors to declare 
almost anything a 'fraud,' and no requirement on their part to prove criminal intent," 
to exert prosecutorial pressure on Wall Street firms. John Fund, Editorial, Eliot the 
'Enforcer,' WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2008, at A21. Similar to Lockyer's expansive use 
of the NSMIA savings clause, the legislative intent behind the 1921 Martin Act 
arguably did not extend to the types of actions brought by Spitzer. See Editorial, Of 
Martin and Mann, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2008, at A20. 
292. See Mathiesen, supra note 292, at 323-26. 
293. United States: Legal Climate Brightens for Wall Street, OXFORD ANALYTICA, May 29, 
2007, at 'II 2, http://www.oxan.com/disp/ay.aspx?ItemlD=DBJ34649 (subscription 
only). Thirty-one out of the current fifty state attorney generals are Democrats. !d. 'II 
3. See also Democrat AGs Back Off Wall Street, FORBES.COM, May 30, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/05/29/attomey-general-democrats-biz-
cx_0530oxford.html (summarizing Oxford Analytica article). 
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services sector; both have been replaced by individuals who 
emphasize a more populist approach centered around consensus-
building. 294 The environmental factors that contributed to their 
prominence as regulatory enforcers no longer exist. 295 In particular, 
there is no longer a federal regulatory vacuum as Congress has taken 
an increased interest in oversight of the securities industry, 
particularly in areas involving investor protection. 296 The regulatory 
climate that allowed state attorney generals to play such an 
aggressive role has shifted in light of federal concerns about the 
effects of overregulation on the competitiveness of domestic capital 
markets. 297 Subsequently, the phenomenon referred to as 
"balkanization" has not occurred as predicted. 298 Regardless, the 
issue of mutual fund prospectus disclosure remains an important one. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Problems with the current regulatory framework cannot be ignored. 
Congress did not intend for the regulation of revenue-sharing 
agreement disclosure involving mutual fund investment advisers and 
distributors to fall under state purview, even under the limited 
umbrella of NSMIA's savings clause. 299 There is merit to the 
contention that additional disclosure of revenue-sharing agreements 
294. See United States: Legal Climate Brightens for Wall Street, supra note 295, ~~ 3, 4, 7, 
12, 13. State Attorney General Jerry Brown, Bill Lockyer's successor, settled the 
Capital Research v. Brown case in February 2008 after American Funds made 
changes to its prospectus and SAl to better disclose its revenue-sharing agreements. 
Press Release, Office of Cal. Attorney Gen., supra note 15. Capital Research agreed 
to pay $2.5 million to cover the State's legal costs. !d. Brown also settled an earlier 
suit against Edward Jones for $7.5 million after the firm made substantial changes in 
disclosure. Press Release, Office of Cal. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Brown 
Settles Edward Jones Lawsuit (Sept. I 0, 2008), http://ag.ca.gov/ 
newsalerts/release.php?id= 1607 &. 
295. See United States: Legal Climate Brightens for Wall Street, supra note 295, ~~ 5, 6, 
10, II. 
296. See, e.g., Robert K. Steel, Under Sec'y for Domestic Finance, Remarks Before the 
Council on Competitiveness: Strengthening our Capital Markets Competitiveness 
(May 17, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
press/releases/hp409.htrn). Steel noted, "regulation at the retail level will require 
some focus on rules, particularly to protect less sophisticated market participants, 
where investor protection must be a paramount focus." /d.~ 29. 
297. See Jeremy Grant, Paulson Vows to Bolster US Competitiveness, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/eb34ca58-d 19f-ll db-b921-000b5dfl 062l.html. 
298. See Arden Dale, Spitzer Effect: Not Quite Devastating, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at 
Cl3. 
299. See supra Part liLA. 
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is needed. 300 However, enabling state regulation of nationally 
distributed mutual fund prospectuses risks a return to the duplication 
and conflict of the pre-NSMIA regulatory landscape, 301 especially 
when the SEC is already taking an active role in this area. 302 
The Capital Research case is indicative of a larger issue that needs 
to be addressed: how to make disclosure more meaningful to 
investors. 303 The promotion of visible, plain English disclosure will 
enable investors to make more informed decisions and take a more 
active role in the investment process. 304 Ideally, the increased 
emphasis on investor-friendly disclosure in the summary prospectus 
will be a strong step towards curbing the need for state intervention to 
protect investors. 305 Our current regulatory system is far from 
perfect, 306 but regulators must continue the search for approaches that 
will "appropriately balance issues of investor protection, market 
integrity and systemic risk, as well as the historic tension between 
state and federal boundaries."307 
Linda M. Stevens 
300. See supra Part III.B.l. 
301. See supra Part III.A. 
302. See supra Part III.B.2. 
303. See supra Part III. C. 
304. See supra Part III. C. 
305. See supra Part III. C. 
306. Steel, supra note 296, ~ 28 ("If we were starting fresh and had a blank page, no one 
would choose to draw a regulatory structure that resembles our current picture."). 
307. !d. ~ 26. 
